Weapons of the Falklands Conflict

 This is Bryan Perrett's book on the weapons systems deployed by both sides in the Falklands War. It was written just after the conflict in 1982, and I picked it up in my local Oxfam bookshop. Not because I don't have a mountain of books on the subject, having written my own book on HMS Ambuscade, but because I was interested in comparing his initial reactions to later studies that have the benefit of data released since the conflict.

After a brief introduction to the conflict, the author divides the weapon systems into three dimensions: naval, air (including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft), and land. He begins each section with a list of the equipment used, followed by a section on the action.

The sinking of the Belgrano outside the exclusion zone was something of a cause célèbre at the time. Whatever the moral and legal issues, he makes a valid point that, although the Belgrano was an old ship, it had Exocet missiles that could have reached the task force. The sinking also drew the Argentine Navy's attention to the presence of at least one Royal Navy hunter-killer submarine. This resulted in the Argentine Navy remaining in port for the remainder of the conflict. 

His comments on the design of Royal Navy frigates with aluminium upper works are interesting, as HMS Ambuscade was one of those. Aluminium has a lower melting point than steel, but a direct hit from a missile would destroy steel as well. The real lessons centred on electronic warfare (in the absence of AWACS) and the merits of various anti-missile systems. The Gannet could not fly off the smaller carriers. This was the first three-dimensional missile war in naval history, and many lessons have been learned since.

While helicopters were not a new weapon system in 1982, they were crucial to the naval and land battles. One of the roles of the naval Lynx helicopter was to act as a missile decoy. This involved the hair-raising manoeuvre of drawing the missile away from the ship and climbing sharply at the last second. The loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and its heavy Chinook helicopters was a big setback, as they could carry 44 infantrymen in one lift.  

In the air battle, the Argentine aircraft were operating at the limit of their operational radius. This meant limited time over the islands. Perrett draws an interesting analogy with the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. The Harrier performed exceptionally well in a role for which it was not originally designed. The Argentine Air Force concentrated on the two carriers, while Perrett argues they would have been better concentrating on the landing ships. He might be right, but we now know more about the problems they had with bomb fuses.

Overall, this is an excellent little book, which hasn't dated as much as I expected. I had the benefit of later research, interviews with sailors who were there, and access to the Ministry of Defence files.