Of all the many books I read in any year, only a few can be described as outstanding and original. This study of 18th-century infantry by Alexander Burns is such a book. If you have a picture of neat lines of infantry marching towards each other, discharging volleys, then this book is a necessary correction. Instead of relying on the manuals and treatises on infantry tactics, Burns focuses on soldiers' writings of what actually occurred in battle. He concludes, ‘infantry soldiers in the eighteenth century sometimes disobeyed their officers’ commands and fought in a way that made sense to them. They aimed their weapons, fought as skirmishers, and fired independently and uncontrolled, often at a greater range than their officers preferred.’
Burns starts with a couple of battles from the little-known War of the Polish Succession, fought in Northern Italy in 1734. These actions highlight some of the themes that he tackles later in the book. The first of these is that the firelock musket was not as inaccurate as we have been brought up to believe. A man-sized target could be hit at 100 yards, and a block of infantry or cavalry at much longer ranges. Another is the assumption that peasant soldiers were automatons that carried out their orders to the letter. Burns examines the village world they came from and argues that it was more contentious and litigious than we might think. This led to soldiers questioning absurd orders and, on occasion, doing what seemed sensible rather than adhering to the textbook orders of their officers. They could fire at will, take cover, and utilise terrain. Officers learned that just beating men didn't work; they needed to show inspirational leadership.
We consider skirmishers as part of line regiments, a Napoleonic innovation. However, there is plenty of evidence that flankers developed during the 18th century. Even the Prussians used Heckenfeuer (controlled skirmishing). Officers were able to trust their troops to use aimed fire and skirmishing, a level of initiative and delegation that deviates from the traditional wisdom. How quickly troops could fire has been a subject of significant debate, not least by wargame rule writers. While four or five rounds a minute was achievable on the parade ground, two or three rounds a minute was more realistic on the battlefield. Firefights could go on for a long time, depleting the number of rounds an infantryman carried very quickly. That doesn't mean they necessarily ran out of ammunition very often; armies developed close support by using ammunition wagons and carts. The conclusion being that firepower increasing played a dominant role.
Volley fire demanded effective manoeuvring on the battlefield, and the Prussians led the way. However, speed and dexterity in loading, rather than robotic obedience, gave them an edge. Neat lines may have been achievable on the parade ground but not on even relatively flat battlefields. We are told that many generals, Suvorov springs to mind, favoured the bayonet over the musket. However, while melee combat happened, it was less frequent than imagined.
Burns finishes with two battles in North America, which reinforce his themes. Although some of the circumstances were different, not least the limited use of cavalry. The conclusions focus on the evidence for writing the history of battle from below. Soldiers rather than officers and manuals. While I might have wished for more examples from Eastern Europe, there is a problem of sources. Russian serfs were not noted for writing memoirs, and there is limited archival evidence from letters home. Nonetheless, this book is an eye-opener on 18th-century warfare, building on the work of the late great Christopher Duffy.
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Some late 18th-century 'Potemkin' Russian infantry from my current project. |